The general question I address through my research is: How can we become better people? To address the issue, I bring different traditions and disciplines into constructive conversations. I do not think there will ever be a conclusive answer to the question, but my exploration so far has led me to many intriguing and rewarding projects. My dissertation provides the justifications, historical contexts, and foundations for answering the question. Due to the limited scope, it does not address some methodological presuppositions it relies on, nor does it delve into certain nuances. I engage with those issues in ongoing projects and plan to continue doing so.

A Developmental Approach to Virtue Ethics (Dissertation)
Moral philosophers typically begin by investigating what virtue is, and only then attempt to understand how to acquire it. This common approach seems reasonable, as understanding the end is thought to precede understanding the means to achieve it. However, I argue that this is mistaken. Drawing on Julia Annas’ discussion of virtue as a developmental concept, I articulate and defend the “epistemic priority of virtue development.” This principle asserts that a virtue learner needs to undergo significant transformation through virtue cultivation in order to grasp what virtue is. I then examine the ethical views of Aristotle and the early Confucians, whose insights further illuminate the issues of virtue and its development.

Understanding Mengzi’s Perspective on Reason and Emotion from the Inside Out
I use an ongoing debate about Mengzi’s view on weakness of will (or akrasia in the Greek tradition) as a case study to highlight a potentially problematic way of studying his thought. I argue that since Mengzi (the work attributed to Mengzi) does not explicitly discuss weakness of will, the text risks becoming a new bottle for old wine. By reading an implicit view of weakness of will into the text, we do not gain many new insights on this topic from Mengzi.
 
It Takes Time to Extend Compassion: The Gradual Extension Interpretation of Mengzi 1A7
I defend Mengzi against the accusations of being inconsistent and proposing a philosophically weak view. I offer a new interpretation of a key passage that contrasts with the widely accepted interpretation. According to the widely accepted “immediate extension” interpretation, Mengzi aims to prompt the king to immediately extend his feelings and be moved to take immediate action. According to my “gradual extension interpretation,” Mengzi aims to bring about a long-term change in the king, so he will act on his compassion in the future. The key difference between these interpretations is that the second requires careful cultivation over time. Alongside presenting this alternative interpretation, I discuss its philosophical implications.

Virtue: The Spirit of Morality
I present a Confucian criticism of modern moral practice. In the Analects, Confucius suggests that a good political system guides people by means of virtue and rituals rather than by means of regulations and punishments. I argue that Confucius’s criticism to legal practice also applies to modern moral practice. According to his critique, the central problem in both practices is their failure to cultivate in individuals the aspiration to become good—an essential element of living a virtuous life.
 
A New Analysis of the “Why Be Virtuous?” Question
Why be virtuous?” is one of the oldest questions in the history of philosophy, and it is notoriously difficult to answer satisfactorily. I argue that this question demands a practical solution, as opposed to a merely theoretical solution. The answer must resonate personally with the inquirer rather than appealing to all “rational beings.” Providing a persuasive answer is difficult because it must reference the lived experience and phenomenology of being virtuous, to which the inquirer does not yet have access.

The Epistemic Irrationality of Racial Profiling
I challenge the view that racial profiling is epistemically rational because it is based on strong statistical inference. I argue that racial profiling is epistemically irrational because the inference it relies on is not valid. In the actual practices of racial profiling, what needs justification is law enforcement officers’ judgment of the crime risk posed by particular individuals rather than the crime risk associated with the racial or ethnic group to which those individuals belong. As a result, an inference is required when the officers judge particular individuals based on the statistical properties of the group. This inference relies on “naked statistical evidence” that lacks the necessary causal explanation to justify the selection of race as a reference class for calculating the criminal risk.